Will Syria’s rebels face a Kurdish front?

DANIEL BRODE

Four decades of unabated Bashar al-Assad rule are testament to the Syrian regime’s mastery of sectarianism in the Middle East. Once again, the al-Assads have utilized this talent to throw another wrench into the Sunni-Western campaign to oust them from Damascus. The regime recognizes the historic tensions between Arabs and Kurds, the incompatibility of pan-Islamism and Kurdish nationalism, in addition to Turkey’s escalating ongoing conflict with Kurdish separatists. This enabled al-Assad to manipulate these realities to his strategic advantage. By withdrawing from the mainly Kurdish northeast this past summer, the regime opened the gates for a Kurdish escalation. With al-Assad’s enemies now struggling to liberate areas from his tanks, fresh fighting between Kurdish militias and Syrian rebels around Aleppo threatens a second front for the already bruised Syrian opposition.

While the al-Assads have suppressed Kurds with decades of “Arabization,” Bashar calculated early on that his Kurdish subjects, as a whole, were unlikely to fight alongside the opposition. Not out of any loyalty, but for historic and strategic reasons.

So far, al-Assad’s gambit has paid off. Kurdish interests vary but often contradict those of their ethnic neighbors. We may call them Syrian or Iraqi Kurds, but their interests are anything but Syrian or Iraqi. That, however, did not stop the opposition from seeking Kurdish fighters to join their ranks.

Unfortunately for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Syrian National Council (SNC), these negotiations failed. The Kurds were reluctant to shed blood for a mainly Arab-Islamist opposition that was unable to offer autonomy in post-bellum Syria. Since then, Syrian Kurds are charting their own course.
Not surprisingly, al-Assad has manipulated Kurdish neutrality for his own benefit. His army’s coordinated withdrawal from Kurdish areas in the summer was a serious development. That redeployment purposefully left hard-line Kurdish militias in control, thereby posing serious strategic problems not only for Syrian rebels, but for al-Assad’s new Turkish enemy to the north. Turkey as a rule is opposed to any Kurdish gains in Syria given concerns over its own restive Kurdish population.

The problems for Syria’s rebels are as follows: the far-leftist Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) has barred Sunni Arab fighters from Kurdish areas and periodically cooperated with al-Assad’s forces in and around Aleppo, all the while expanding its control over strategic checkpoints and smuggling routes near the vital Turkish border. Over time, these actions and Kurdish neutrality have not only discredited the opposition’s narrative as a country united against al-Assad, they have put both sides on a collision course.

That collision took place on Oct. 26. Heavy fighting erupted between the Peoples’ Defense Unit (YPG), a PYD militia, and Syrian rebels in Aleppo’s Kurdish neighborhood of Ashrafieh. Sunni Arab gunmen from the Tawhid Brigade entered the neighborhood as a show of strength before the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha. Unfortunately for them, Kurdish militias were not so keen on their presence. After dozens of rebel fighters lay dead, Ashrafieh was back under Kurdish control.

Additional clashes between Kurds and Arabs broke out over checkpoints in the vicinity of the Turkish border. As reports of the fighting emerged, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey’s arch enemy and PYD ally, consequently threatened to intervene against Syria’s rebels. While fighting remains largely localized, the PKK threat could be a game changer.

Both the rebels and PYD for the most part would like to avoid a Kurdish war at this time. A new front could jeopardize what is perceived to be a historic opportunity for Kurdish nation-building in Syria. The rebels, moreover, can hardly afford to fight the Kurds, especially if the battle-tested PKK becomes involved. Still, the Kurds and the rebels remain highly decentralized, with many rebel units operating pursuant to their own agenda – often to further the Arab-Islamist cause in the Middle East. The Doha agreement, which has theoretically united Syria’s opposition, is supposed to remedy this issue. It remains to be seen whether the most powerful Kurdish faction in Syria, the PYD, will be enticed to support the new coalition. History tells us this would be a rare occurrence. So while both rebels and Kurds are talking cease-fire, tensions and diverging goals could complicate those efforts over the long run.

Kurdish Syria is a highly strategic region. Straddling Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, numerous players have an interest in thwarting Kurdish gains here. Such interests coupled with tensions on the ground will make further Kurdish-rebel fighting a real possibility. PKK wants to use the region as a launching pad for operations against Turkey. This is not a remote possibility, as it is already being reported that PKK gunmen are already stationed along the Turkish-Syrian border. That presence ultimately contributes to the rebels’ struggle to take Aleppo. This, along, with diverging interests and a history of Arab-Kurdish fighting, could lead to a second sectarian war in Syria. In the end, this works best for al-Assad. The regime recognized that Kurdish nationalism and pan-Islamism are two largely incompatible ideologies.

The opposition’s inability to promise the Kurds autonomy was the ultimate deciding factor. As a result, al-Assad has simply laid the groundwork for a second front in the Syrian civil war.