Israeli army report reveals years of misreading Hamas

TEL AVIV

An investigation by the Israeli military has determined that Hamas was able to carry out the deadliest attack in Israeli history on Oct. 7, 2023, because the much more powerful Israeli army misjudged the militant group’s intentions and underestimated its capabilities.

In the first such an extensive report by the military, the main findings were that the region’s most powerful and sophisticated military misread Hamas’ intentions, underestimated its capabilities and was wholly unprepared for the surprise attack by thousands of heavily armed militants in the early morning hours of a major Jewish holiday.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) outlined intelligence material that was not only misinterpreted for the Hamas 2023 attack, but also persistently mishandled over the years.

A central misconception was that Hamas, which seized control of Gaza from the Palestinian Authority in 2007, was more interested in governing the territory than fighting Israel, the inquiry found.

During the attack, the military’s excessive reliance on early warnings for defense preparations, the overwhelming numerical disadvantage faced by troops against invading Hamas militants and the failure to grasp Hamas’ actions during the attack were major failures.

The “perception” probe revealed that, before the assault, the IDF believed Hamas in Gaza did not pose a major threat to Israel, had no interest in a large-scale war, had suffered significant losses in its tunnel networks and that any cross-border threat would be neutralized by Israel’s high-tech border barrier.

The investigation underscored a growing disconnect between the IDF’s assessment of Hamas and the group’s actual operations.

The “intelligence assessments” probe found that the Military Intelligence Directorate had received intelligence and plans detailing Hamas’s intent to launch a large-scale attack on Israel over several years but dismissed them as unrealistic and unlikely.

Instead, military intelligence wrongly assumed that slain Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was a “pragmatist who sought to avoid a major escalation with Israel.”

Intelligence also said that Sinwar, as the mastermind of the Oct. 7, 2023 attack, had begun planning it as early as 2017.

Military planners had envisioned that, at worst, Hamas could stage a ground invasion from up to eight border points. In fact, Hamas had more than 60 attack routes.

In comments made to military commanders this week, and shared with the media on Feb. 27, the army's chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, said he took responsibility for the army's failures.

“I was the commander of the military on Oct. 7, 2023 and I have my own responsibility. I also carry the weight of all your responsibility — that, too, I see as mine,” said Halevi, who announced his resignation in January and is set to step down next week.

The military’s findings are in line with past conclusions reached by officials and analysts. The military released only a summary of the report and military officials outlined its findings.

“Oct. 7 was a complete failure,” said one military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity in line with regulations.

According to an official, the report blamed the military for being overconfident in its knowledge and not showing enough doubt in its core concepts and beliefs. The summary said a key lesson was that Israel could not let a threat develop on its border.

It spelled out several recommendations, including creating special units meant to prepare for such surprise and large-scale events, as well as reform in the military intelligence department that would foster “openness, skepticism, listening, learning.”

The findings could pressure Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to launch a widely demanded broader inquiry to examine the political decision-making that preceded the attack.

Many Israelis believe the mistakes of Oct. 7 extend beyond the military, and they blame Netanyahu for what they view as a failed strategy of deterrence and containment in the years leading up to the attack.

The prime minister has not taken responsibility, saying he will answer tough questions only after the war. Despite public pressure, including from the families of the roughly 1,200 people killed in the attack and the 251 hostages, Netanyahu has resisted calls for a commission of inquiry.